The National Election Defense Coalition Opposes Adopting Ballot Marking Devices as the Primary Method of Voting
WHAT ARE BALLOT MARKING DEVICES
Ballot Marking Devices (BMD) are computerized devices that display a digital ballot, allow voters to make selections, then print a paper record of the voters’ choices. BMDs can be enabled with accessible user interfaces, providing essential assistive technology for voters that may be unable or uncomfortable marking a paper ballot by hand.
With a BMD, the voter uses a touchscreen to choose candidates, then the device prints out a ballot summary card that the voter can examine for accuracy, before depositing it in a ballot box or into a ballot scanner. In some system configurations, “auto-cast” can be enabled and voters are not given the option to verify the printed ballot. Instead the ballot summary card is cast, scanned, tabulated and dropped in the ballot container at the backside of the machine without voter review.
All polling locations should be equipped with one or more BMDs with assistive interfaces that are prominently available. However, BMDs should not be adopted as the primary method of voting for all voters because they introduce unnecessary security risks, they incur unnecessary expense, and they are more likely to cause voters to wait to be able to vote.
Voting system vendors are widely promoting the use of BMDs for all voters, and several states have or are currently contemplating requiring all voters to use a BMD to mark a paper ballot. This option is very profitable for the vendors but very problematic for democratic elections.
THE PROBLEMS:
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND AUDITABILITY: Many ballot marking devices print out a “ballot summary card” that has the voters’ selections recorded on it in plain text and in a barcode which means that the ballot contains two separate records of voter intent, introducing legal questions regarding the official ballot of record. The ballot summary card does not display an entire ballot, it is meant to contain only selections made by the voter. When the ballot summary card is scanned, the scanner reads only the barcode which cannot be read or verified by the voter.
When providing assistive BMDs, jurisdictions should opt for a BMD that marks a standard ballot, not a ballot summary card. This ensures that voters that need assistive technology will not submit a ballot that is unlike the ballots marked without the device, which could compromise voter secrecy. This also eliminates the potential legal problems inherent with a ballot summary card that includes votes encoded in a barcode and recorded in plain text.
INSPECTION OPTION IS NOT ENOUGH: The evidence available indicates most voters are unlikely to catch errors in their computer-marked ballot summary, so misconfigured, malfunctioning or hacked BMDs could record votes incorrectly and the voter might not notice, or might notice and think it’s the voter’s own error. Moreover, some BMDs are designed so that the ballot summary prints with small font under glass, making it difficult if not impossible for the voter to verify the recorded choices.
NO DISPUTE RESOLUTION: The dispute-resolution mechanism is unclear; pollworkers can’t tell if an error is the machine’s fault or your fault.
LONGER & CUMBERSOME PROCESS: Voting on a BMD is slow and is more likely to create long lines. Hand-marked paper ballots allow less pressure because you’re not holding up the line at the voting machine, you’re sitting behind a privacy screens with a pen and a piece of paper, and you don’t approach the optical scanner until you’re satisfied with your ballot. Locations that have adopted BMDs for all voters have experienced long lines, causing voters to wait or potentially leave without casting a ballot.
“ALL IN ONE” SYSTEMS CAN CHANGE VOTES:
All in One systems are those that combine both a BMD and a scanner into a single unit. These are now also sold for use as a primary voting system.
Unlike hand-marked paper ballots counted on scanners and regular BMDs, these new systems can add fake votes to the machine-marked “paper ballot” after it’s been cast, experts warn. Any manual audit based on such fraudulent “paper ballots” would falsely approve an illegitimate electronic outcome.
According to experts, the voting systems with this capability include the ExpressVote All In One by Election Systems & Software, LLC (ES&S), the ExpressVote XL All In One by ES&S, and the Image Cast Evolution All in One by Dominion Voting.”
HIGH & HIDDEN COSTS
The initial outlay to purchase BMDs for all voters costs two or more times the cost for voting equipment used to scan handmarked paper ballots. Jurisdictions that adopt hand-marked paper ballot voting systems can save millions of dollars that can be used for other vital services.
For example, Guiford County, North Carolina expected to purchase BMDs for all voters and budgeted $8M. The County wisely chose hand-marked paper ballots instead and was able to purchase new voting systems for the entire county for $ 2.2M, freeing up nearly $ 6M that could be used to pay for repairs to school heating and air-conditioning systems, and raises for teachers and school bus drivers.
Contrary to assertions by voting system vendors, using BMDs will not save counties the cost of layout and printing of paper ballots. Each county will still need to print absentee/emergency/provisional/challenge ballots even if they use BMDs.
Additionally, though the State would pay for the devices, the vendor retains proprietary ownership of the software, meaning not only will the vendor control the software and be able to effectively prevent the State or the voters from examining it, the State will have to pay software licensing fees in perpetuity to be able to use the software in the machines that the State has purchased.
Ballot Marking Devices will incur higher on-going costs to conduct elections.
BMDs will require expensive, ongoing technical maintenance and service contracts.
Each BMD will need to programmed with election contest files before each election, incurring programming costs.
BMDs will require additional storage and trucking costs.
BMDs require more time and effort for election workers to setup and take down.
They require considerable space and power outlets in polling locations.
In summary, BMDs must be prominently available at all polling locations to provide all voters easy access to use a BMD to mark a paper ballot if the voter chooses but BMDs should not be the primary voting method. Systems that use BMDs as the primary voting device are less reliable, secure or verifiable. All-BMD systems are far more expensive and waste taxpayer dollars. Employing BMDs as the primary voting systems is likely to cause long lines and disenfranchise voters. BMDs that produce ballot summary cards with barcodes and human readable text introduce significant legal ambiguity regarding the official record of voter intent. Accessible BMDs should mark a standard ballot to protect voter secrecy.
The National Election Defense Coalition Opposes Adopting Ballot Marking Devices as the Primary Method of Voting
The information on BMDs was compiled from these resources:
There is no Reliable Way to Detect Hacked Ballot-Marking Devices
-Philip B. Stark, University of California, Berkeley
DHS to Assess Risks Posed to Ballot-Marking Devices
- Mark Niesse, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
Serious design flaw in ESS ExpressVote touchscreen: “permission to cheat”
- Andrew Appel, Freedom to Tinker
New "hybrid" voting system can change paper ballot after it's been cast
-Jennifer Cohn, Who, What, Why?