E-VOTING SYSTEMS PUT DEMOCRACY AT RISK
WHY America's voting systems are vulnerable to undetectable rigging and cyber attacks
Electronic voting systems have been on the rise for decades in the United States, having replaced hand-counted paper ballots in nearly every jurisdiction. The 2002 Federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA) funneled $3.9 billion to states to buy electronic voting systems from a small handful of unaccountable private companies whose "proprietary" software is legally off limits to public inspection, even by elections officials.
Like all computers, these systems are susceptible to software bugs and programming errors, as well as miscalibrations that “flip” votes, and machine breakdowns that cause long lines, particularly in minority communities where older machines are often placed.
Due to a lack of stringent and uniform Federal security standards, e-voting systems can also be hacked or rigged undetectably by anyone with access to the voting machines or the software. They are also highly vulnerable to cyber attacks by hackers, foreign or domestic.
Cyber security experts are warning that the foreign interference in the 2016 election was a “dress rehearsal” for 2020.
READ: The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine
Election security experts have repeatedly proven that current testing and certification processes, including “logic and accuracy” tests, cannot be relied on to ensure voting system security.
READ: Hackers were told to break into U.S. voting machines. They didn’t have much trouble.
FAQ & Misconceptions About E-Voting
WHICH VOTING SYSTEMS ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS?
INTERNET VOTING: THE WORST
Any Internet voting structure which transmits voted ballots electronically via email, facsimile or Internet portal is the most vulnerable to hacking as these ballots are directly exposed to cyber attacks and cannot be adequately secured.
TOUCHSCREENS: UNACCEPTABLE
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) touchscreen voting machine provide no paper ballot and cannot be audited or verified. Any error or fraud may not be detectable by the voter because the machine can display the correct vote choices, while digitally recording the wrong vote choices.
The addition of a flimsy and poorly designed “Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail” (VVPAT) has failed to provide the same security and proof of voter intent as a hand marked paper ballot, and is notoriously difficult to use in a post-election audit.
BALLOT MARKING DEVICES:
NOT TO BE USED FOR ALL VOTERS
Ballot Marking Devices (BMD) are computerized devices that display a digital ballot, allow voters to make selections, then print a paper record of the voters’ choices. BMDs can be enabled with accessible user interfaces, providing essential assistive technology for voters that may be unable or uncomfortable marking a paper ballot by hand.
BMDs must be prominently available at all polling locations but BMDs should not be the primary voting method. Systems that use BMDs as the primary voting device are less reliable, secure or verifiable. All-BMD systems are far more expensive and waste taxpayer dollars. Employing BMDs as the primary voting systems is likely to cause long lines and disenfranchise voters. BMDs that produce ballot summary cards with barcodes and human readable text introduce significant legal ambiguity regarding the official record of voter intent. Accessible BMDs should mark a standard ballot to protect voter secrecy.
OPTICAL BALLOT SCANNERS:
ONLY SECURE WITH A PAPER AUDIT
Optical scanners count hand-marked paper ballots, but they are also computers, and therefore can count votes incorrectly due to errors, malicious programming, or hacking.
Malicious programming within the scanner would not be detected by the "logic and accuracy" tests conducted by elections officials.
VOTE BY MAIL: EASY & INSECURE
Paper ballots cast in popular vote-by-mail systems are counted by optical scanners, not by hand.
Lack of transparency, lack of security, opportunities for voter intimidation, and high levels of ballot mishandling are some of the reasons to limit these voting systems to serve only those who absolutely require them.
HAVE WE EVER LOST VOTES OR HAD ELECTIONS DISRUPTED DUE TO E-VOTING MACHINES?
Yes. E-voting machines have: Added and subtracted votes not cast by voters, changed voters’ choices on the screen, given voters the wrong ballot, passed pre-election testing and failed on election day, reversed election outcomes, and broken down, causing long lines during elections.
In the following examples the errors were so pronounced it was clear that there was a problem in the count:
In 2019, Pennsylvania’s new ES&S touchscreen ballot marking devices created chaos, reporting statistically impossible results and requiring a hand count of the paper ballots. According to the New York Times, the same problematic machines were also used in Philadelphia and its surrounding suburbs — areas of Pennsylvania that could prove decisive next year in one of the most critical presidential swing states in the country.
In Palm Beach County, Florida, in March 2012, a problem with the programming software caused votes to be assigned to the wrong candidate and the wrong contest. The election was conducted using voter-marked paper ballots, which permitted the county to conduct a full hand-count of the ballots, changing the winner in one contest.
In North Carolina in 2004, DRE voting machines lost over 4,500 votes. A statewide contest was determined by fewer votes, compelling the state to re-run the election.
Without mandatory, routine post-election audits of paper ballots, it is possible that smaller errors or malicious programming in close elections could go undetected, potentially swinging the results to the wrong candidate.
ARE OUR VOTING MACHINES CONNECTED TO THE INTERNET?
Most voting machines are not directly connected to the Internet, but this does not ensure they cannot be remotely hacked.
Before each election, each voting machine must receive programming information about the candidates and contests in that election, via an election management system (EMS). The EMS is typically hosted on regular desktop or laptop computers which can potentially be used for other, non-election related, Internet-connected activities.
The device that hosts the EMS may be exposed to the Internet and serve as a pathway for a hacker to attack the EMS and infect the voting machines with malicious software.
Many voting machines do have built-in wireless capability which will expose the voting machines to the Internet when transmitting election results.
Any states and counties that allow for a return of online ballots are also vulnerable to system-wide infiltration of their voting technology.
WHO OWNS THE ELECTRONIC VOTING TECHNOLOGY AND WHY CAN'T THE PUBLIC VIEW THE SOFTWARE?
The vendors retain proprietary ownership of the software that is used to record and count votes. It is not available for public inspection and in most cases, cannot be inspected by the jurisdiction licensing the software.
This creates a "black box" for election technology that takes the democratic process out of the public sphere and into a virtual back room.
Additionally, when a jurisdiction purchases commercially available voting systems, they typically purchase the hardware outright, but they must license the software. This means the county or state government must pay ongoing software licensing fees in order to use the software on the voting machines each year.